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This paper uses new data on fiscal transparency for a cross-section of countries; 
these data possess several advantages. First, the data are based on in-depth reports 
using a standardized methodology and protocol. Second, this study covers 82 
countries, more than previous comparable studies. Third, the fiscal measures used 
have been obtained with the collaboration of government authorities, which 
makes them particularly reliable. Finally, the data collection has been undertaken 
at a high level. These new data permit examination of a relevant but little-studied 
issue, the role of institutional quality in a country’s fiscal transparency. It is 
shown that there is in fact a causal relationship between institutions and 
transparency. The findings are robust to changes in specification and a host of 
transparency sub-measures. 
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Despite the worldwide attention that transparency has received in the last decade, empirical 
studies on its determinants are still quite limited. In recent years scholars and financial 
institutions have concentrated their studies on the positive effects of fiscal transparency such as 
improved access to international capital markets, the attraction of foreign direct investment, 
prevention of financial crises and reduction of interest rate spreads. As is often the case, light 
was shed on the topic following hard shocks; for instance, both the Mexican (1994) and Asian 
(1997) crises became turning points in the debate, raising concerns about the possible impacts of 
a lack of transparency.  Starting from the reasonable expectation that policy recommendations 
which solely emphasize economic factors while disregarding institutional concerns may be 
unsubstantiated, we investigate the role of the institutional environment in shaping the 
informational structure of various national fiscal systems.  
Kopits and Craig (1998) identify fiscal transparency as “openness toward the public at 
large about government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, 
and projections. It involves ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and 
internationally comparable information on government activities so that the electorate and 
financial markets can accurately assess the government’s financial position and the true costs and 
benefits of government activities, including their present and future economic and social 
implications.” 
Some researchers study the relationships between fiscal transparency and fiscal 
performances and/or other macroeconomic indicators, providing several explanations and 
different theories rather than a unique and shared answer. For instance, Hameed (2005) runs a 
cross-country regression with 57 observations and concludes that transparency matters for credit 
rankings in the sense that they are positively related to transparency, and that countries with 
higher fiscal transparency general index have better fiscal discipline.  Jarmuzek (2006) assesses 
the role of fiscal transparency in establishing better fiscal discipline. Considering 27 ex-socialist 
countries, he finds a negative, although weak, relationship between fiscal transparency and debt 
accumulation.  Furthermore, he finds that there is no statistically significant evidence supporting 
the importance of fiscal transparency in determining fiscal performance, and only marginal 
significance when correcting for endogeneity.  Incidentally, Gleich (2003) shows that budget 
procedures which reduce collective action problems in Eastern Europe are associated with 
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increased fiscal discipline. Milesi-Ferreti (2004) studies the interactions between fiscal 
transparency and fiscal rules, focusing on the effects of the Maastricht Treaty on EU member 
countries. He finds that fiscal transparency shapes fiscal performance, as a highly transparent 
fiscal context makes politicians implement the measures necessary to balance the budget. Alt and 
Lassen (2006) show that fiscal transparency reduces public debt and deficits, even after 
controlling for political variables like common law history, political competition, and 
presidential system.  Ferejohn (1999) models transparency as a constitutional choice of an 
information structure. At the beginning of every period the incumbent chooses the degree of 
precision of the signal perceived by the electors (principals), knowing that in most cases this 
informational accuracy would be directly proportional to the amount of resources that voters 
would be willing to allocate to politicians. Agents who want to manage a larger amount of public 
goods will raise fiscal transparency levels in order to be perceived as more trustworthy by voters 
who will eventually give them more resources.  Alt and Lowry (1994) argue that democrats 
increase transparency to achieve their preferred higher amount of public goods, while Alt, 
Lassen and Rose (2006) focus on the determinants of fiscal transparency by exploring its 
political and economic causes. They suggest that both politics and fiscal policy outcomes 
influence transparency levels.  
We use new data on fiscal transparency (FT) for a cross-section of countries, and these 
data possess several advantages. First, they are based on in-depth reports using a standardized 
methodology and protocol. Second, this is the first study that has such large country coverage, 82 
in total. Third, the fiscal measures have been obtained with the collaboration of government 
authorities, which makes them particularly reliable. Finally, the data collection has been 
undertaken at a high level. Thus, the main contribution of this paper is the provision of a new 
index of FT, constructed by translating in numerical values the qualitative information presented 
in 82 countries’ Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), issued by the 
International Monetary Fund. Additionally, we have assembled three sub-indicators according to 
the following categories: clarity and assurances of information, roles and responsibility 
(Quality&Resp), open budget preparation (BudgPrep), and public availability of information 
(InfoAvail).  
We find that better institutions yield higher levels of fiscal transparency, and different 
aspects of the institutional framework have different impacts on our disaggregated fiscal 
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transparency measures. Furthermore, we corrected for endogeneity by employing an instrumental 
variables approach. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines fiscal 
transparency, reviewing the relevant literature, explains our methodological strategy and presents 
our dataset. Section 3 presents and discusses empirical results and robustness checks. Section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. Data and Empirical Approach 
 
We use new data from the IMF’s Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). 
Many of the authors reviewed so far have concentrated their attention on particular categories of 
countries or limited geographical areas, either because of the focus of their study or because of 
difficulties in providing a standardized measure of fiscal transparency for countries belonging to 
different social, political and economic contexts.
1  ROSCs, however, provide a feasible means of 
constructing a standardized measure of fiscal transparency in diverse countries: regardless of the 
nation analyzed, these reports are always written with the same methodology and under the same 
criteria.  Hameed (2005), for instance, uses this source based on the IMF’s Code to develop 
fiscal transparency indices for 57 countries. His indices look at FT from four different 
perspectives: i) data assurances (DAS); ii) medium-term budgeting (MTBF); iii) budget 
execution reporting (BEX); and iv) fiscal risk disclosures (FR). Following the approach of Allan 
and Perry (2003), Hameed considers 20 different items (e.g., quasi-financial activities, 
contingent liabilities or tax expenditure) and gives each of them a mark between 0 and 1 
according to the evaluation presented in the Reports.  
Our index of FT is calculated for 82 countries, and to the best of our knowledge no other 
contribution in the literature has encompassed such a large sample. We started from the “Code of 
Good Practises on Fiscal Transparency” revised by the IMF in 2007, which contains 45 good 
practices summarized in one sentence each, and we selected 39 of them as the most relevant for 
                                                           
1 Jarmuzek et al. (2006) construct an index consisting of five clusters, including (1) medium-term budgeting and 
analysis, (2) accounting and data quality, (3) extra-budgetary fiscal operations, (4) intergovernmental relations, and 
(5) the role of auditing in the budgetary process and the importance of the Ministry of Finance over spending 
ministries. Guerrero (2001) uses an index of budget transparency a\developed by a group of civil and academic 
institutions for four Latin American countries focusing on: participation and elaboration of the budget, oversight, 
accountability and access to information. Gleich (2003) uses survey data for ten Eastern European countries and 
develops four indices that capture the stages of the budget process.  Alt et al. (2006) code survey responses for nine 
budget procedures and create a transparency index. Allan and Perry (2003) go through the ROSCs for most of the 
European Union (EU) accession candidate countries and focus on medium-term frameworks, accounting, reporting 
and oversight standards, off budget activities and fiscal risks, and intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
  4 
 
our purpose and the most frequently evaluated.
2 We then examined the ROSCs to see the extent 
to which each country followed IMF recommendations in each selected practice, assigning a 
mark between zero and ten: for example, “0” corresponds to “code not observed at all”; we 
marked “2” if the country’s adherence to IMF suggestion was only minimal, “4” if it was limited, 
“6” if the Code was followed only partly, “8” if mostly followed, and “10” if the IMF’s 
recommendations  for that practice were totally respected. Our FT index is nothing but the mean 
of the marks assigned for each practice. Although the 2007 revision of the Code aggregates 
practices into four main clusters (clarity of roles and responsibilities, open budget processes, 
public availability of information, assurance of integrity), we see fiscal transparency as threefold 
and therefore aggregate practices into three sub-indices: clarity and assurances of information, 
roles and responsibility (Quality&Resp), open budget preparation (BudgPrep), and public 
availability of information (InfoAvail).   
The latter sub-index (InfoAvail) aims to measure the extent to which in every country the 
public is provided with comprehensive information on past, current and projected fiscal activity 
and on all major risk, and if a commitment is made to timely publications. This sub-index 
additionally evaluates the extent to which fiscal information is presented in a way that facilitates 
policy analysis and promotes accountability. The first sub-index (Quality&Resp) evaluates how 
each country adheres to the following principles: “the government sector should be distinguished 
from the rest of the public sector; there should be an open legal, regulatory and administrative 
framework for fiscal management; fiscal data should meet accepted data quality standards; fiscal 
activities should be subject to effective internal oversight and safeguards; fiscal information 
should be externally scrutinized.”  Lastly, BudgPrep is a proxy that measures how clear national 
procedures are for budget execution, monitoring and reporting, as well as rating how much 
budget preparation follows an established timetable and is guided by well-defined 
macroeconomic and fiscal policy objectives (IMF Revised Code, 2007). Table 1 shows in detail 
the composition of each index, while for a detailed description of each single topic we refer to 
the IMF ROSC website (http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp). Finally it is useful to 
point out that, due to the availability of the data, the sub-indices are calculated in different years 
                                                           
2 Not all the ROSCs of every country contain all the information required, especially the oldest ones, so some 
countries might have a higher number of practises evaluated compared to other ones, but we believe that this issue 
does not substantially change our results. When we consider only the practices evaluated for every country our 
results are substantially unchanged. 
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for different countries, ranging from 2000 (as for Cameroon and Papua New Guinea) to 2008 (as 
for Belgium and Namibia). We assess the relationship between fiscal transparency (FT) and the 
quality of institutions (InstQual). Including some control variables in the matrices Mi 
(macroeconomic) and Pi (political), we follow Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) in estimating the 
following relation: 
FTi = f (InstQuali, Mi, Pi) 
Our econometric analysis will allow for different linear specifications, but the benchmark 
equation on which our analysis is based is the following:  
 
FTi = α+ β1* logGDPi + β2* INSTQUAL + β3* DEFICITi + β4* INFLATIONi + β5* 
MAJORITYi +  β6* GOVFRACi + γ * CONTINENT + εi                   (1) 
 
where α is a constant, βs are the coefficients, CONTINENT is a vector of territorial dummies and 
εi is an uncorrelated error with mean zero (for explanation of the other controls see below).
3 All 
the explanatory variables are expressed as an average for the decade 1990-2000 (for available 
years), with the purpose of reducing reverse causality biases and leaving a reasonable span of 
time between the causes of the approval transparency-enhancing reforms and their effect on 
fiscal systems. In terms of the quality of institutions—our main explanatory variable, InstQual—
we refer to the governance indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 
(2003). Combining both large opinion surveys and measures based on polls of experts, the 
authors define governance using six clusters of variables: voice and accountability 
(Voice&Account), political instability and violence (PolStab), government effectiveness 
(GovEff), regulatory burden (RegBurden), rule of law (RuLaw) and control of corruption 
(ContrCorrupt). The first two variables capture the process by which authorities are selected and 
replaced; they include indicators that measure aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and 
political rights, intended to assess the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the 
                                                           
3 The areas considered are Europe, Africa, Asia, Middle East, Oceania, North America and South America. All the 
regression are calculated with heteroskedasticity robust – standard errors. Results are basically unchanged if we use 
the assumption of homoskedasticity Additionally, we also augmented the latter specification with more macro and 
demographic controls, considering  two more equations: FTi = α+ β1* logGDPi + β2* INSTQUAL + β3* DEFICITi 
+ β4* INFLATIONi + β5* MAJORITYi + β6* GOVFRACi +  β7* ETFRAi  + β8* DEBTi  + γ * CONTINENT + εi and  
FTi=  α+  β1* logGDPi + β2* INSTQUAL + β3* DEFICITi + β4* INFLATIONi + β5* MAJORITYi + + β6*  
GOVFRACi +  β7* ETFRAi + β8* DEBT + β9* URBANPOPi + β8* AGEPOP + γ* CONTINENT + εi 
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selections of governments. In particular, PolStab measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government in power will be destabilized or removed by possibly unconstitutional or violent 
mechanisms. The next two clusters refer to the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement policies. While GovEff encompasses perceptions of the quality of the provision of 
public services,
4  RegBurden focuses more on policies themselves, including whether those 
policies are market-friendly or so excessively regulatory that they become an obstacle or burden 
for trade, business and development. The last group indicates the level of respect that citizens 
have for the state and national institutions, focusing specifically on rule of law (RuLaw) 
enforcement and control of corruption (ContrCorrupt).
5  Using an unobserved components 
model that expresses the observed data as a linear function of unobserved governance plus a 
disturbance term capturing perception errors and/or sample variation in each indicator, 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón aggregate the governance indicators into each of the six 
dimensions mentioned above. To arrive at an aggregate governance indicator, which we label 
quality of institutions (InstQual), we compute the mean of these values for each country. It is 
worth mentioning that these variables lack temporal coverage, as they have only been calculated 
since 1996 and are not available on an annual basis. The scores range from –2.5 to 2.5, and we 
take the average of the available values from 1996 to 2004. Again, the higher the value, the 
better the institutional quality indicator. Below, in the robustness checks section, we will also 
consider some variables contained in the well known Polity V database (Jaggers and Moore, 
1995) and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2006).
6 
There is almost no ambiguity in predicting the sign of the coefficient β2 of our 
institutional variable, intuitively expected to be positive and significant: in fact, politicians might 
have more incentives to promote FT in a sounder institutional context. More informed public 
opinion, a more efficient and honest bureaucracy, rule of law and control of corruption could 
                                                           
4  GovEff  synthesizes features such as the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil servants from political pressures, and the credibility of the government. 
5 RuLaw represents the extent to which citizens have confidence and abide by the rules of society such as the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, or the enforceability of contracts; cc refers to the perception of the 
degree of prevention of the exercise of public power for private gains. 
6 The latter furnishes proxies to measure the extent to which various relevant institutional aspects are in place for a 
given country: government stability, military in power, law and order, control of corruption and quality of the 
bureaucracy. From the former database (Polity V), we borrowed the proxies POLITY2 and DEMOC, annual indices 
based on three categories that try to account for different aspects characteristics of a democracy: executive 
recruitment, responsiveness or independence of the executive authority and extent of political competition or 
opposition. 
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more severely punish bribes and electoral clientelism, practices that might be facilitated by low 
levels of fiscal transparency. We include income as an explanatory variable since GDP per capita 
levels can affect fiscal transparency. Richer countries can afford better informational systems, 
and they might have greater incentives to publicize their better results. LogGDP, expressed in 
constant year 2000 dollars, is considered in log because we found this non-linear function to 
have a better explanatory power in terms of R-squared. This variable is taken from the World 
Development Indicators database by the World Bank, which is the source of all our macro and 
demographic variables, apart from Deficit, which is taken from the IMF database. Following the 
literature (particularly Alt, Lassen and Rose, 2006), we consider deficit and debt (both expressed 
as a percentage of annual GDP) because poor fiscal performances could lead citizens to be more 
demanding of government transparency. DEBT is included only in equation (2) because it is not 
available for some countries and reduces the number of observations (from 78 to 65) included in 
our regressions. Additionally, we control for some demographic variables most likely to affect 
electorate’s overall responsiveness: percentage of population living in urban areas, Urbanpop, 
and percentage of people aged between 14 and 65, Agepop. 
We also included some political controls widely used in literature; they are taken from 
the WGI database (World Bank and Beck et al., 2006).  The literature predicts FT levels to be 
higher in countries where electoral competition is stronger, i.e., where the executive has a lower 
percentage of parliament seats (majority) compared to other countries. In fact, Hanssen (2004) 
finds that stiffer electoral competition positively affects the independence of (judiciary) 
institutions, and the same might happen to fiscal transparency.
7  We therefore include two 
proxies of political competition: the margin of votes (in percentage) of the majority in power and 
government fractionalization.
8 
                                                           
7 Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) note a parallelism between transparency reforms and Hanssen’s delegation model 
(2004), where there are two parties competing for authority and the incumbent can choose to delegate policy choice 
to an independent institution, the judiciary.  
8 A priori, the effect of government fractionalization on fiscal transparency is ambiguous. If the government is 
composed by many parties, each of them would like to use public goods to pursue its own clientelistic interests, 
being sure that being accountable for, say, deficits, inefficiencies or bad performances is more difficult than in a 
one-party system, so reaching an agreement on reforms that open up the budget process to the public would be more 
difficult with many parties in power. Conversely, incumbents may prefer to have less discretion over public goods 
but limit the misuse of them by other incumbents (with whom they share office); thereby the fractionalized 
government could internally reach a compromise to manage resources in a transparent framework. Hypothetically, 
each ruling party might also be willing to let voters identify clearly who has done what in the government and open 
up the budget process to the electors. Alternatively, we could consider government fractionalization another measure 
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Lastly, drawing on the predictions of Alt and Lassen (2006), we could expect that the 
higher the political polarization, the less similar the preferences of opposite parties, and the 
higher the benefits of tying the hands of a partisan adversary. Nonetheless, these authors note 
that, while general agreement among political parties is needed in order to approve transparency- 
enhancing reforms, the probability of reaching a compromise might be inversely proportional to 
the distance between parties in the political/ideological spectrum. Since we cannot predict ex 
ante the sign of the coefficient of polarization, following Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) we 





Table 4 presents simple correlations among our dependent variables and the institutional 
indicators. As can be observed, not only are the signs consistent with the logic that better 
institutions yield higher levels of fiscal transparency, but also the degree of correlation is quite 
strong, and in all cases it is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Figure 1 shows this 
positive relationship between the index of fiscal transparency and the quality of institutions 
indicator, both in aggregate terms. The first three columns of Table 5 present results for our OLS 
regression, considering specifications (1), (2) and (3), respectively. The dependent variable is 
always our summary index of fiscal transparency, FT. As expected, in the OLS regression the 
InstQual coefficient is always highly significant at 1 percent level. The coefficient of Deficit in 
columns (2) and (3) is positive and significant, consistent with the findings of Alt, Lassen and 
Rose (2006). LogGDP is significant only when we run our benchmark regression (1), ceasing to 
be significant when more controls are included.  
We acknowledge that our OLS estimation can suffer from endogeneity problems, 
particularly regarding variables such as InstQual,  logGDP, and Deficit. This problem is 
encountered in much of the literature; for example, Petrie (2003) or Hameed (2005). As 
mentioned above, in order to reduce reverse causality problems, all our macro-economic controls 
are expressed as the mean value of the decade 1990-2000, while FT indices refer at least to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of political competition, i.e., competition is so stiff that no party has the majority necessary to rule by itself and 
alliances are needed. 
9 Governance indicators and fiscal transparency may be endogenous, but we will use 2SLS regression (see below) to 
isolate the effect only in one direction, from institutions to transparency, as well as to control for the endogeneity of 
some macro variables like income, deficit and debt. 
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year 2001 onwards. We are still aware of the correlation between current levels and those of the 
recent past, so we control for endogeneity by running some two-stage least square (2SLS) 
regressions, instrumenting for the suspected endogenous variables with proxies widely used in 
the literature. We considered five possible instruments, but we decided to use only religious 
affiliation and legal system origin. We additionally instrument our possibly endogenous variables 
with settlers’ mortality, latitude and ethnic fractionalization.
10 
Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003) have shown that ethnic 
heterogeneity negatively affects institutions and subsequently GDP levels because the more 
ethnically fractionalized a country is, the more often dominant groups would shape governmental 
policies in order to expropriate from ethnic losers, restricting their freedom of opposition and 
limiting the production of public goods to prevent those outside the ruling group from benefiting 
and getting stronger (La Porta et al., 1998).  Using ethnic fractionalization (ETFRA) as an 
instrument could create at least two problems: endogeneity and flaws in the exclusion restriction 
(i.e., significance of the instrument coefficient in the second-stage regression). The latter happens 
if ethnic fractionalization has a direct effect on FT: in that case, it cannot be considered a good 
instrument. But how could ETFRA affect FT apart from shaping institutions? If we follow 
Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) in considering ETFRA as an exogenous measure of political 
polarization or political fragmentation, then, as argued by Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006), it could 
have a significant impact on politicians’ incentives to approve transparency-enhancing reforms, 
as discussed above. 
  
La Porta et al. (1998) use legal system origins to estimate the quality of institutions, by 
classifying each country in one out of five categories according to its commercial legal tradition: 
common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian law and socialist law. The 
authors’ thesis is that a country’s legal tradition shapes its institutions over time, and that “the 
distinctions between the French, the German and the Scandinavian law are relatively subtle, but 
the distinction between socialist, civil and common law are not.” Finally, an additional valuable 
                                                           
10 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) propose exploiting differences in European settlers’ mortality rates to 
estimate institutions, because in territories where Europeans faced high mortality rates they were not able to settle 
and they set up extractive institutions, while places where their mortality rates were comparatively lower 
experienced the promotion of sound institutional policies that persisted until now; although apparently flawless, the 
instrument “settler mortality” is not ideal for our purpose because it can be applied only to countries that used to be 
former European colonies. This would lead us to drop nearly half of the observation in our sample. As shown in the 
Appendix, however, under these circumstances that our results lose some significance but do not change 
considerably. 
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perspective for analyzing a country’s institutions is its citizens’ religious affiliation.ctive to look 
at differences in institutions is religious belonging.
11 Following Weber (1958) and Putnam et al. 
(1993), La Porta et al. (1998) argue that government performance is influenced by “the 
percentage of population in each country belonging to different religious affiliations”, showing 
that institutions of largely Protestant countries perform better than nations with a majority of 
people belonging to “hierarchical religions” such as Roman Catholicism, Islam and Greek 
Orthodoxy.
12 
As implied above, we decide to instrument GDP levels, deficit and institutional variables 
with legal system origin and percentages of Protestant, Catholic and Muslim individuals living in 
a given country. We decided to leave settlers’ mortality and latitude out of the regression and to 
include ethnic fractionalization as a control in the main equation. The exclusion restriction 
implied by our IV strategy is that, conditional on the controls included in the regression, our 
instruments have no direct effect on fiscal transparency apart from determining our instrumented 
variables. In fact, we see no reason why legal system origin and religious affiliation could 
determine a country’s FT but for shaping its institutions and influencing its GDP levels and fiscal 
performances.
13 
The last three columns of Table 5 report the results of our 2SLS regression—equations   
(1), (2) and (3), respectively—which confirm the robustness of our OLS results: even when we 
control for endogeneity, institutions appear to have a positive and significant coefficient on FT, 
as well as on government fractionalization and inflation. In all the 2SLS regressions β2—the 
coefficient referring to institutional quality—is almost doubled in comparison to the OLS 
regression. According to our 2SLS estimation of equation (1), a one-unit increase in our 
institutional quality index (which ranges from -2.5 to 2.5), might raise FT by 2.8 points, quite a 
strong impact if we consider that our fiscal transparency index is a 0-10 scale. To provide a 
practical example, our coefficient predicts that shifting from the institutional framework of 
Latvia to that of Germany would, ceteris paribus, increase FT by a quantity equal to the 
                                                           
11 Alesina et al. (2003) have shown that religious fractionalization per se does might not influence economic and 
institutional development and it might be endogenous, but they reckon that different religious affiliations do matter 
in shaping institutions. 
12  La Porta et al. (1998) view countries with a Muslim or Catholic heritage as more interventionist because, 
compared to Protestantism, these religions “like to tell people what to do…and grew to support state power.” 
13 First-stage regressions and the Sargan test tell us that the exclusion restriction works well for all our instrumental 
variables, while it is not possible to test for endogeneity of ETFRA in our first-stage regression—whether we 
include it or not, results in our second-stage regression do not change significantly. 
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difference in FT between Spain and Bangladesh. Interestingly enough, instrumented income is 
never significant, while in column 6, which refers to equation (1), the coefficient of ETFRA is 
positive and significant, contrary to the results of Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006), but consistent 
with the idea that higher political polarization raises the incentives to tie opponents’ hands with 
FT reforms. 
In Table 6 we consider the three sub-indices of fiscal transparency, and we run our 
benchmark regression (1), both OLS and 2SLS, using each as a dependent variable. From this 
table we can observe that the quality of institutions variable yields the expected positive 
coefficient and it is always statistically significant. In terms of relative magnitude of the 
coefficients, institutions seem to affect mostly InfoAvail (especially in the 2SLS case), with the 
lowest coefficient for Quality&Resp. 
As a robustness check, we observed the effect on fiscal transparency indices of each of 
the governance indicators that compose our InstQual summary index, as well as of other 
institutional proxies taken from other datasets described earlier. Tables 7 presents the results of 
OLS regression (1) for every sub-index, tested by each institutional component (2SLS results are 
available in Appendix 2). Every institutional proxy seem has a significant coefficient in 
explaining our FT summary index, apart from government stability measure taken from the 
ICRG database, but this variable is never significant in any regression. Apparently, whether 
governments are stable or change very often does not affect fiscal transparency in a given 
country; the same is true for political stability in determining data quality and clarity of 
responsibilities.  
We acknowledge that our proxies for institutional quality may suffer of measurement 
error, and this “noise” may create an attenuation bias that lowers the value of our coefficients, 
although it is difficult to provide a numeric interpretation of our indices. We further aggregate 
our six indicators into a simple average in order to obtain a synthetic measure of the quality of 
institutions. Also, as some of these indicators may be more important than others in 
characterizing institutional quality or FT, assigning each of them equal weight may not be the 
best way of clustering them.  We also applied Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to aggregate 
our measures. PCA is a method that aims at describing a variable with a set of variable with a 
lower dimensionality. Mathematically, we can define PCA as an orthogonal  linear 
transformation that transforms the data into to a new coordinate system such that the greatest 
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variance by any projection of the data comes to lie on the first coordinate (called the first 
principal component). Intuitively, with this method we obtain the best linear combination of the 
variables in a least square sense. The first principal component explains about 87 percent of the 
variations in institutional  data, and factor loadings have almost the same weight, with the 
exception of Political Stability (PolStab), which is slightly lower than other variables.
14 
Apart from the regressions reported, we control for other macro and political variables. 
Among the former, we mention yearly GDP growth rate (instrumented and not), instrumented 
public debt over GDP, size of the public sector as a percentage of GDP, economic openness 
(measured as the amount of exports plus imports over the GDP), population, population squared, 
GDP per capita in levels, GDP per capita squared, instrumented inflation and external debt. The 
significance of our “institutional” coefficients is not affected when we include other “political 
variables,” dummies to control for presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary system, 




In this paper we study the relation between fiscal transparency and institutional factors. Whereas 
fiscal transparency has become a prominent concern in recent decades, most of the research so 
far has tended to focus on the links between fiscal transparency and budget performance, fiscal 
discipline and other economic variables. If political, institutional and governance factors are 
examined in relation to fiscal transparency issues, though, they are more likely to be seen as 
determinants than explicative parameters. In our analysis, we show that institutions matter for 
fiscal transparency, as can be observed by the highly statistically significant results we obtained 
after using our fiscal transparency index and various governance indicators. Assembling data 
from 82 countries’ ROSCs we provided a summary index of fiscal transparency and three sub-
indices for different characteristics using information from public balance sheets: clarity and 
assurances of information, roles and responsibilities, open budget preparation, and public 
availability of information. 
We found that higher levels of institutional quality or governance give way to better 
fiscal transparency indicators. Moreover, after considering possible endogeneity issues and 
                                                           
14 PCA for our FT indices: 89 percent of the variance explained by the first principal component, with almost the 
same factor weight for all the components (i.e., they are equally important and highly correlated with each other); 
when I run the regression using our PCA aggregation indices the results are never affected. 
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instrumenting for the institutional and some economic variables, the two-stage least squares 
regression produced almost the same results as the OLS method. The evidence thereby supports 
our hypothesis that not only does fiscal transparency matters for institutional issues, but 
governance and quality of institutions are also determinants of fiscal transparency. Overall, our 
hypothesis that democratic institutions have a positive and significant impact on the transparency 
of public fiscal systems seems to be confirmed. 
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Table 1. Fiscal Transparency Sub-Indices: Reference to the IMF Code 
 
Main Index  IMF’s Best practice definition 
Open Budget 
Processes 
A budget calendar should be specified and adhered to. Adequate time should be allowed for the draft budget to 
be considered by the legislature. 
The annual budget should be realistic, and should be prepared and presented within a comprehensive medium-
term macroeconomic and fiscal policy framework. Fiscal targets and any fiscal rules should be clearly stated and 
explained. 
A description of major expenditure and revenue measures, and their contribution to policy objectives, should be 
provided. Estimates should also be provided of their current and future  budgetary impact and their broader 
economic implications 
The budget documentation should include an assessment of fiscal sustainability. The main assumptions about 
economic developments and policies should be realistic and clearly specified, and sensitivity analysis should be 
presented. 
There should be clear mechanisms for the coordination and management of budgetary and extrabudgetary 
activities within the overall fiscal policy framework. 
 The accounting system should provide a reliable basis for tracking revenues, commitments, payments, arrears, 
liabilities, and assets.  
A timely midyear report on budget developments should be presented to the legislature. More frequent updates, 
which should be at least quarterly, should be published. 
Supplementary revenue and expenditure proposals during the fiscal year should be presented to the legislature in 
a manner consistent with the original budget presentation. 
Audited final accounts and audit reports, including reconciliation with the approved budget, should be presented 




The budget documentation, including the final accounts, and other published fiscal reports should cover all 
budgetary and extra budgetary activities of the central government. 
Information comparable to that in the annual budget should be provided for the outturns of at least the two 
preceding fiscal years, together with forecasts and sensitivity analysis for the main budget aggregates for at least 
two years following the budget. 
Statements describing the nature and fiscal significance of central government tax expenditures, contingent 
liabilities, and quasi-fiscal activities should be part of the budget documentation, together with an assessment of 
all other major fiscal risks. 
Receipts from all major revenue sources, including resource-related activities and foreign assistance, should be 
separately identified in the annual budget presentation. 
The central government should publish information on the level and composition of its debt and financial assets, 
significant non debt liabilities (including pension rights, guarantee exposure, and other contractual obligations), 
and natural resource assets. 
The budget documentation should report the fiscal position of subnational governments and the finances of 
public corporations. 
The government should publish a periodic report on long-term public finances. 
A clear and simple summary guide to the budget should be widely distributed at the time of the annual budget. 
Fiscal data should be reported on a gross basis, distinguishing revenue, expenditure, and financing, with 
expenditure classified by economic, functional, and administrative category. 
The overall balance and gross debt of the general government, or their accrual equivalents, should be standard 
summary indicators of the government fiscal position. They should be supplemented, where appropriate, by other 
fiscal indicators, such as the primary balance, the public sector balance, and net debt. 
Results achieved relative to the objectives of major budget programs should be presented to the legislature 
annually. 
The timely publication of fiscal information should be a legal obligation of the government. 
Advance release calendars for fiscal information should be announced and adhered to. 
The national audit body or equivalent organization should submit all reports, including its annual report, to the 
legislature and publish them. Mechanisms should be in place to monitor follow-up actions. 
The annual budget and final accounts should indicate the accounting basis used in the compilation and 
presentation of fiscal data. Generally accepted accounting standards should be followed 
 




data, roles and 
responsibilities 
Budget forecasts and updates should reflect recent revenue and expenditure trends, underlying macroeconomic 
developments, and well-defined policy commitments.   
Data in fiscal reports should be internally consistent and reconciled with relevant data from other sources. Major 
revisions to historical fiscal data and any changes to data classification should be explained. 
Public finances and policies should be subject to scrutiny by a national audit body or an equivalent organization 
that is independent of the executive. 
Independent experts should be invited to assess fiscal forecasts, the macroeconomic forecasts on which they are 
based, and their underlying assumptions. 
A national statistical body should be provided with the institutional independence to verify the quality of fiscal 
data. 
The structure and functions of government should be clear. 
The fiscal powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government should be well defined. 
The responsibilities of different levels of government, and the relationships between them, should be clearly 
specified. 
Relationships between the government and public corporations should be based on clear arrangements. 
Government relationships with the private sector should be conducted in an open manner, following clear rules 
and procedures. 
The collection, commitment, and use of public funds should be governed by comprehensive budget, tax, and 
other public finance laws, regulations, and administrative procedures. 
Laws and regulations related to the collection of tax and non-tax revenues, and the criteria guiding administrative 
discretion in their application, should be accessible clear, and understandable. Appeals of tax or non-tax 
obligations should be considered in a timely manner. 
There should be sufficient time for consultation about proposed laws and regulatory changes and, where feasible, 
broader policy changes. 
Contractual arrangements between the government and public or private entities, including resource companies 
and operators of government concessions, should be clear and publicly accessible. 
Government liability and asset management, including the granting of rights to use or exploit public assets, 
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Table 2. Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Description  Source 
Fiscal 
Transparency (FT) 
Index constructed by taking the average of the scores (between 0 and 10) assigned to 
the practises evaluated in the ROSCs and listed in Table 1. 
Authors’ 
calculation  
Quality&Resp  Variable based on IMF country ROSCs to evaluate the extent to which a country 
follows IMF’s Code of good practices in clarity and assurances of information, roles 




BudgPrep  Variable based on IMF country ROSCs to evaluate the extent to which a country 
follows IMF’s Code of good practices in open budget preparation. The higher the 
variable, the more transparent a country is in this area. 
Authors’ 
calculation  
InfoAvail  Variable based on IMF country ROSCs to evaluate the extent to which a country 
follows IMF’s Code of good practices in public availability of information. The higher 
the variable, the more transparent a country is in this area. 
Authors’ 
calculation  
LogGDP  Logarithm of GDP per capita, normalized to year 2000 US$ (average for the period 
1990-2000, when years available) 
WDI 
InstQual  Simple Average of the variables VA, PS, GE, RQ, RL, CC  Authors’ 
calculation 
Voice&Account Voice  and  Accountability: it measures aspects of the political process, civil liberties, 
and political rights, intended to assess the extent to which citizens are able to participate 




PolStab  Political Stability: It measures aspects of the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government in power will be destabilized or removed by possibly unconstitutional or 
violent mechanisms (average for the period 1996-2004, when years available).  
“ 
GovEff  Government Effectiveness: It encompasses perceptions of the quality of the provision 
of public services, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil servants from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government (average for the period 1996-2004, when years available).  
“ 
RegBurden  Regulatory Burden: it focuses on the policies themselves, including how market-
friendly or excessively regulatory are the policies so that they become an obstacle or 
burden for trade, business and development (average for the period 1996-2004, when 
years available). 
“ 
ContrCorrupt  Control of Corruption: It refers to the perception of the degree of prevention of the 
exercise of public power for private gains (average for the period 1996-2004, when 
years available).  
“ 
RuLaw  Rule of Law: It represents the extent to which citizens have confidence and abide by the 
rules of society such as the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, or the 
enforceability of contracts (average for the period 1996-2004, when years available).  
“ 
Deficit Yearly  Balance  deficit as a fraction of GDP (average for the period 1990-2000, when 
years available). 
IMF 
Inflation inflation,  consumer  price - annual % (average for the period 1990-2000, when years 
available. 
WDI 
Majority  Number of seats held by the government. It is calculated by dividing the number of 
government seats by total seats. 
WGI 2007 
Govfract  Government fractionalization: probability that two deputies picked at random from 
among the government parties will be of different parties. 
WGI 2007 
Etfra  Index of ethnic fractionalization.  Alesina et al. 
(2003) 
Debt_gdp  Public debt as a percentage of GDP (average for the period 1990-2000, when years 
available). 
WDI 
Urbanpop  Percentage of population living in urban areas (average for the period 1990-2000).  WDI 
Agepop  Percentage of population aged between 15 and 64 y.o. (average for the period 1990-
2000, when years available). 
WDI 
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Table 2., continued 
 
Variable Description  Source 
Religion  Identify the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the three 
most widely spread religions in the world in 1980. For countries of recent formation, 
the data are available for 1990-95. The numbers are in percent (scale from 0 to 100). 
The three religions identified here are Roman Catholic, Protestant and Muslim. The 
residual is called "otherreli". 
La Porta et al 
(1998) 
Legal Origin  Dummies that identify the legal origin of the country. There are five possible origins: 
English Common Law, French Commercial Code, German Commercial Code, 
Scandinavian Commercial Code, Socialist/Communist laws. 
La Porta et al 
(1998) 
Govstability  Index on risk implied by Government Stability in each country. Higher values of this 
index indicate lower risk. We use mean values of this index for the years between 1990 
and 2000 (when available). 
ICRG 
Corruption  Index on risk implied by corruption in each country. Higher values of this index 
indicate lower risk. We use mean values of this index for the years between 1990 and 
2000 (when available). 
ICRG 
Militaryinpolitics  Index on risk implied by the presence of military in politics in each country. Higher 
values of this index indicate lower risk. We use mean values of this index for the years 
between 1990 and 2000 (when available). 
ICRG 
Laworder  Index on risk implied by rule of law in each country. Higher values of this index 
indicate lower risk. We use mean values of this index for the years between 1990 and 




Index on risk implied by accountability in each country. Higher values of this index 
indicate lower risk. We use mean values of this index for the years between 1990 and 
2000 (when available). 
ICRG 
Bureaucracyquality  Index on risk implied by the quality of the bureaucracy in each country. Higher values 
of this index indicate lower risk. We use mean values of this index for the years 
between 1990 and 2000 (when available). 
ICRG 
Polity   Variable based on expert judgment on aspects of institutionalized democracy and 





Sum of exports and imports of goods and services, in local currency, as a share of GDP, 
in local currency. 
WDI 
External Debt  Share of Public External Debt as a share of GDP. Year 1990.  WDI 
Proportional  Dummy that takes value 1 if candidates are elected based on the percent of votes 
received by their party and/or if sources specifically call the system “proportional 
representation”. It takes value 0 otherwise.  
WGI 2007 
Plurality  Dummy that takes value 1 if legislators are elected using a winner-take-all / first past 
the post rule; 0 otherwise. 
WGI 2007 
System  Dummies for parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential system.  WGI 2007 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable   Observations  Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max
FT 82  4.184 1.854 1.721  9.040
Quality&Resp 82  4.072 2.001 0.857  8.714
BudgPrep 82  4.229 1.890 1.000  9.166
InfoAvail 82  4.236 1.957 1.833  9.250
LogGDP  81 7.478 7.477 4.956  10.470
InstQual 82  0.058 0.779 -1.443  1.773
Voice&Account 82  0.107 0.825 -1.526  1.582
PolStab 82  0.009 0.822 -2.038  1.442
GovEff 82  0.079 0.847 -1.652  2.101
RegBurden 82  -0.001 0.848 -1.388  1.934
ContrCorrupt 82  -0.010 0.896 -1.590  2.336
RuLaw 82  0.166 0.762 -1.846  1.763
Deficit 82  -4.1965 6.989 -37.36  8.329
Inflation 80  90.897 208.722 1.037  958.995
Majority 81  0.645 0.151 0.364  1.000
Govfrac 82  0.245 0.230 0.000  0.761
Etfra 82  0.412 0.240 0.011  0.930
Debt_gdp 67  58.746 39.156 4.075  213.907
Urbanpop 82  54.017 21.392 9.009  96.772
Agepop 82  60.506 6.3566 47.77  70.693
Protestant 82  10.168 18.357 0.000  76.300
Catholic 82  36.168 37.193 0.000  99.400
Muslim 82  19.01 32.265 0.000  99.400
French Commercial Code  82  0.451 0.501 0  1
Socialist Law  82  0.280 0.452 0  1
German Commercial Code  82  0.037 0.189 0  1
Scandinavian Commercial Code  82  0.012 0.110 0  1
English Common Law  82  0.220 0.416 0  1
Govstability  64 7.635 0.970 5.108  10.392
Corruption  70 3.428 1.093 1.033  6
Militaryinpolitics  70 4.097 1.421 0.392  6
Laworder  70 4.026 1.133 1.600  6
Democraticaccountability  70 4.022 1.129 1.792  6
Bureaucracyquality  70 2.267 1.011 0  4
Policy  79 4.187 5.557 -6.909  10
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
 
   FT 
Quality& 
Resp BudgPrep  InfoAvail 
Voice& 
Account PolStab GovEff  RegBurden RuLaw 
Contr 
Corrupt 
Quality&Resp  0.9249*                           
BudgPrep  0.9322*  0.8157*                      
InfoAvail  0.9696*  0.8293*  0.8690*                   
Voice&Account  0.7541*  0.6754*  0.6554*  0.7682*                
PolStab  0.5405*  0.5023*  0.4835*  0.5353*  0.7952*             
GovEff  0.7868*  0.7235*  0.6852*  0.7879*  0.8582*  0.7176*            
RegBurden  0.7275*  0.6586*  0.6502*  0.7276*  0.8790*  0.6765*  0.8930*         
RuLaw 0.7921*  0.7226*  0.6806*  0.8014*  0.8848*  0.7565*  0.9678*  0.8840*     
ContrCorrupt 0.7925*  0.7241*  0.6814*  0.8006*  0.8573*  0.7286*  0.9710*  0.8617*  0.9701* 
InstQual  0.7849* 0.7159*  0.6849*  0.7899*  0.9400* 0.8334* 0.9661* 0.9245*  0.9760* 0.9635* 
*Statistically significant at one percent or higher. 
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Table 5. Fiscal Transparency Estimations 
 
   OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
LogGDP 0.236*  0.190  0.322  -0.317  -0.360  -0.137 
(0.126) (0.151) (0.256) (0.431) (0.483)  (0.708) 
InstQual  1.351*** 1.544*** 1.563*** 2.803*** 2.864*** 2.480** 
(0.224) (0.243) (0.223) (0.856) (0.931)  (1.004) 
Deficit 0.024  0.055**  0.053**  0.052  0.165  0.133 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.066) (0.113)  (0.101) 
Inflation 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002*  0.003*  0.002* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) 
Majority -0.105  -0.424  -0.327  0.913  1.277  0.887 
(1.082) (1.214) (1.173) (1.423) (1.950)  (2.012) 
Govfrac 1.944***  1.875***  2.051***  1.612**  1.288  1.672** 
(0.578) (0.625) (0.623) (0.761) (1.031)  (0.800) 
Etfra 0.593  0.702  1.144  1.031* 
(0.474) (0.470)  (0.730)  (0.589) 
Debt_gdp 0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002 
(0.003) (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Urbanpop -0.013  -0.016 
(0.012) (0.017) 
Agepop 0.002  0.023 
(0.051) (0.071) 
Constant  2.050 2.321* 1.806 5.378* 5.269 3.191 
(1.311) (1.378) (2.554) (3.172) (3.310)  (3.494) 
                    
Observations  78 65 65 78 65  65 
R-squared  0.794 0.812 0.817 0.679 0.702  0.763 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***significant at 1 percent; **significant at 5 percent, * 
significant at 10 percent seven territorial dummies (europe, asia, africa, middle east, oceania, north america, 
south america) are included in all the regressions but not reported the columns 1 2 and 3 consider LogGDP, 
InstQual and Deficit to be exogenous variables, and provide Ordinary Least Squares estimates. The 
columns 4 5 6 show the second stage of the two-stage least square procedure in order to account for 
possible endogeneity of these variables. The instruments used are legal system origin and percentage of 
muslim, catholic and protestant in any country. 
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Table 6. Sub-Indices of Financial Transparency 
 
    Quality&Resp BudgPrep  InfoAvail Quality&Resp BudgPrep  InfoAvail 
OLS OLS  OLS 2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
LogGDP 0.458**  0.152  0.154  0.275  -0.383  -0.639 
(0.178) (0.180)  (0.151) (0.507) (0.574)  (0.516) 
InstQual 1.296***  1.300***  1.390***  2.111**  2.577**  3.331*** 
(0.275) (0.317)  (0.238) (0.836) (1.118)  (1.007) 
Deficit  0.030*  0.022  0.017 0.062 0.037  0.047 
(0.016) (0.024)  (0.023) (0.065) (0.063)  (0.086) 
Inflation  0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.002 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) 
Majority  -0.134 0.814  -0.680 0.775 1.542  0.521 
(1.390) (1.327)  (1.178) (1.662) (1.544)  (1.682) 
Govfrac 1.688**  1.844***  2.144***  1.301  1.648**  1.794** 
(0.690) (0.672)  (0.635) (0.821) (0.823)  (0.876) 
Constant  0.184 2.161  3.132**  0.860 5.546  8.083** 
(1.701) (1.763)  (1.474) (3.624) (4.351)  (3.820) 
                    
Observations  78 78  78 78 78  78 
R-squared  0.740 0.673  0.774 0.697 0.591  0.591 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***significant at 1 percent; **significant at 5 percent, * 
significant at 10 percent; seven territorial dummies (europe, asia, africa, middle east, oceania, north america, 
south america) are included in all the regressions but not reported the columns 1 2 and 3 consider logGDP, 
InstQual and Deficit to be exogenous variables, and provide Ordinary Least Squares estimates. Columns 4, 5 and 
6 show the second stage of the two-stage least square procedure in order to account for possible endogeneity of 
these variables. The instruments used are legal system origin and percentage of muslim, catholic and protestant in 
any country.  
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Table 7. Robustness to Changes in Institutional Measures, OLS 
 
   FT  Quality&Resp  BudgPrep  InfoAvail 
Voice&Account  1.103*** 1.145*** 0.988*** 1.119*** 
(0.200) (0.238) (0.286) (0.212) 
PolStab 0.524**  0.486*  0.588**  0.513** 
(0.217) (0.258) (0.269) (0.219) 
GovEff  1.266*** 1.173*** 1.249*** 1.311*** 
(0.230) (0.262) (0.308) (0.253) 
RegBurden  1.093*** 1.212*** 1.032*** 1.034*** 
(0.242) (0.228) (0.342) (0.254) 
ContrCorrupt  1.184*** 1.029*** 1.088*** 1.306*** 
(0.183) (0.238) (0.255) (0.203) 
RuLaw  1.300*** 1.164*** 1.252*** 1.384*** 
(0.206) (0.260) (0.290) (0.221) 
Govstability -0.0415  -0.0198  -0.153  0.0251 
(0.160) (0.172) (0.197) (0.173) 
Corruption  0.578***  0.598*** 0.426** 0.643*** 
(0.156) (0.176) (0.200) (0.152) 
Militaryinpolitics 0.307**  0.156  0.416***  0.346*** 
(0.128) (0.170) (0.152) (0.123) 
Laworder 0.666***  0.558**  0.744***  0.687*** 
(0.222) (0.238) (0.268) (0.230) 
Democraticaccountability 0.935*** 0.848*** 0.922*** 0.988*** 
(0.208) (0.230) (0.292) (0.209) 
Bureaucracyquality  0.973*** 0.998*** 0.961*** 0.977*** 
(0.262) (0.292) (0.320) (0.282) 
Polity  0.130*** 0.135*** 0.121*** 0.128*** 
    (0.029) (0.037) (0.038) (0.030) 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.; ***significant at 1 percent; **significant at 5 percent, * 
significant at 10 percent; results are based on the same OLS specification employed in column 1 of Table 5, with 
the reported variable (e.g.: Voice&Account) instead of InstQual 
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Appendix 1.  
 
Data on Fiscal Transparency 
 
Albania  3,59  Korea,  Rep  5,48 
Algeria 2,10  Kyrgyz  Rep  2,83 
Armenia 4,28  Latria  3,77 
Azerbaijan 2,20  Lebanon  1,93 
Bangladesh 2,52  Lithuania  4,04 
Barbados 4,00  Macedonia  5,12 
Belarus 1,72  Malati  1,84 
Belgium 7,92  Mali  2,88 
Benin 3,80  Mauritania  2,33 
Brazil 7,54  Mexico  4,17 
Bulgaria 2,64  Moldova  4,92 
Burkina Faso  2,80  Mongolia  3,32 
Cameroon 2,30  Morocco  3,75 
Canada 8,56  Mozambique  2,88 
Chile 7,17  Namibia  3,67 
Colombia 3,76  Netherlands  9,04 
CostaRica 5,08  Nicaragua  2,08 
Croatia 2,96  Pakistan 2,52 
Cyprus 4,50  Papua  N.G.  3,81 
Czech Rep.  5,63 Paraguay  2,68 
El Salvador  1,71  Peru  4,96 
Equatorial 1,92  Philippines 3,84 
Estonia 4,70  Poland  4,80 
Fiji 2,48 Portugal  6,12 
France 8,12  Romania  4,92 
Gabon 3,16  Russian  Fed.  3,72 
Georgia 3,54  Randa  2,22 
Germany 7,56  Samoa  2,72 
Ghana 2,80  Slovak  Rep.  6,32 
Guatemala 3,18  Slovenia  5,04 
Honduras 3,14  Spain  5,48 
Hungary 6,92  Sri  Lanka 3,80 
India 4,28  Sweden  8,73 
Indonesia 3,26  Tajikistan  3,88 
Iran 2,56 Tanzania  3,44 
Israel 6,88  Tunisia  3,59 
Italy 5,73  Turkey  3,36 
Japan 6,34  Uganda  2,96 
Jordan 1,78  Ucraine 5,55 
Kazakhstan 3,15  United  States  8,43 










Robustness to Changes in Institutional Measures, IV 
 
   FT  Quality&Resp  BudgPrep  InfoAvail 
Voice&Account 2.302***  1.894**  2.190**  2.559*** 
(0.742) (0.744) (0.956) (0.793) 
PolStab 0.237  1.112  0.972  -0.596 
(0.983) (1.197) (1.110) (1.302) 
GovEff 2.270***  1.451*  1.875*  2.971*** 
(0.677) (0.814) (0.949) (0.851) 
RegBurden 1.858***  1.231*  1.563*  2.388*** 
(0.603) (0.654) (0.834) (0.752) 
ContrCorrupt 2.268***  1.629**  2.013***  2.779*** 
(0.541) (0.685) (0.725) (0.620) 
RuLaw 2.359***  1.750**  2.237**  2.786*** 
(0.755) (0.746) (1.001) (0.852) 
Govstability  0.0169 -0.21 -0.709 0.551 
(0.954) (0.980) (1.017) (1.188) 
Corruption  1.206***  1.147*** 1.183** 1.252*** 
(0.345) (0.328) (0.452) (0.386) 
Militaryinpolitics 0.295  0.703  0.856  -0.265 
(0.689) (1.081) (0.947) (0.691) 
Laworder -0.481  -0.594  0.107  -0.714 
(1.194) (1.134) (1.231) (1.418) 
Democraticaccountability 1.824*** 1.695**  1.675** 1.936*** 
(0.661) (0.682) (0.799) (0.684) 
Bureaucracyquality 1.564**  1.292**  1.331*  1.835** 
(0.697) (0.613) (0.736) (0.830) 
Polity  0.284** 0.254*  0.286* 0.287** 
    (0.131) (0.142) (0.162) (0.138) 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***significant at 1 percent; **significant at 5 percent, * 
significant at 10 percent; results are based on the same 2SLS specification employed in column 4 of Table 5. 
 
 